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COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY PETITIONS
COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSS-CLAIMS, AND THIRD-PARTY
PETITIONS UNDER THE 1945 MISSOURI CODE*
JOHN J. CZYZAKt
COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY PROCEDURE
The Missouri Code of Civil Procedure of 1945 liberalized the
practice as to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
petitions. This is not an attempt at a critique. The attempt is
solely one at a clarification of existing practices within a novel
pattern.
I. COUNTERCLAIMS
Under this Code, counterclaims may be classified as mandatory
or permissive. Section 73 provides:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim, not the
subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the
pleading, the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrences that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.'
This is the so-called mandatory counterclaim provision. Unless
a party pleads any claim not the subject of a pending action
which he has against the opposing party when the pleading is
filed, and which arises out of the same transaction or occurrences,
he will be held to have waived such claim. 2 The clear intention
of the framers was that the court in one action should settle all
matters in controversy relating to the transaction or occurrences
which is the foundation of the suit.' Since no attempt has been
made to define "counterclaim," "transaction," or "occurrences,"
some difficulty is to be expected in construing this section.
*The Code of Civil Procedure of Missouri, which became effective 1 Jan-
uary, 1945, may be found in Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 847.1-847.145 (Supp.
1949). The references throughout this article are to Sections 1-145, which
correspond to the numbers following the decimal point in the Missouri
statutes.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a).
2. It is claimed that the compulsory provision is too harsh and that a
penalty of barring recovery for costs in a subsequent action on the counter-
claim is to be preferred. See Legis., 37 COl,. L. REv. 462 (1937).
3. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland et al., 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 31(1948).
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In interpreting the terms in question, it is necessary to keep
in mind that the codifiers intended to leave much to the discretion
of the court in each case. Thus, how directly a cause of action
must arise out of the transaction or occurrences might properly
be left to the circumstances of each case. That it would include
the aggregate of all the circumstances which constitute the
foundation therefore seems clear. The word "transaction" has
been defined in Ritchie v. Hayward to include "all the facts and
circumstances out of which the injury complained of... arose."4
That the terms under consideration have been given broad
meanings is supported by recent Missouri cases. In State ex rel.
Fawkes v. Bland et al.,5 the relator-husband sued for divorce.
The wife denied the husband's alleged grounds for divorce. She
further filed a cross-petition (counterclaim) for separate main-
tenance for herself and her child. Among the questions the
court considered was one of procedure, whether the wife had
the legal right to file a counterclaim for separate maintenance
in her husband's divorce suit. The court by way of dictum
made it very clear that while under Section 1516; the defendant
retained the optional right to file a counterclaim for divorce,
notwithstanding the mandatory provision of Section 73, the
latter nevertheless applies to counterclaim for separate main-
tenance. The court said:
We agree with the Court of Appeals opinion that Sec. 2'[of the new Civil Code] does continue Sec. 1516 in force as
to divorce, and that the defendant still retains the optional
4. 71 Mo. 560, 562 (1880).
5. 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 31 (1948).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1516 (1939) provides: "In all suits for divorce
from the bonds of matrimony, it shall be lawful for the defendant in his
or her defense thereto, to set forth and charge, in his or her answer to
the plaintiff's petition, any of the facts specified in this article which, if
proved, would entitle such defendant to a divorce; and the defend-
ant may, in his or her answer, pray the court, for the causes stated
in the answer, that he or she be divorced from the bonds of matri-
mony entered into with the plaintiff; and such answer shall be sworn to
in the same manner as the original petition; and upon the hearing of the
cause, if the court shall be satisfied that the defendant is the injured party,
it shall enter judgment divorcing the defendant from the said plaintiff,
as prayed in the answer."
7. Civil Code of Missouri, Section 2, provides: "This code shall be
known and cited as the Civil Code of Missouri and shall govern the pro-
cedure in the supreme court, court of appeals, circuit courts and common
pleas courts in all suits and proceedings of a civil nature whether cognizable
as cases at law or in equity, unless otherwise provided by law. It shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." [Italics supplied].
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right granted by Sec. 1516 to file a cross-bill for divorce or
not, notwithstanding the compulsory provision of Sec. 73
of the new Code. That right is more substantive than
procedural; and it can hardly be thought the new Code
intended to compel the innocent and injured defendant in
such a suit to file a cross-action for divorce and seek to
sever the marital relation, or else waive the right altogether
(on the same grounds). Sec. 61(9)8 of the new Code still
recognizes there are some claims which not only need not
be, but cannot be, properly united in the same pleading.
But we do not agree that the same conclusion follows by
analogy with respect to separate maintenance. It is true
Secs. 3376, 33821 conferring that right are permissive (as
are all statutory causes of action). But they are very
general, and wholly unlike Sec. 1516 in the divorce law.
Sec. 3382 merely adopts the general practice in civil suits.
There is nothing to the contrary anywhere in the chapter.
The claim seeks only a money judgment, not a severance of
the martial relation-thereby coming partly but not wholly
within the scope of a divorce case. Where a husband has
instituted the divorce litigation and the wife merely files a
defensive answer, if he prevails she will be entitled to
nothing, whereas if she prevails the marriage relation will
still exist and he will be legally bound to provide maintenance
for her. She chooses the battle ground. If she elects merely
to contest his divorce and preserve the marital status, un-
doubtedly her right to separate maintenance is within the
subject matter of the divorce suit. It clearly comes under
the requirement of Sec. 73 of the new Code, the objective of
8. Civil Code of Missouri, Sec. 61 (9), provides: "The following objec-
tions and other matters may be raised by motion whether or not the same
may appear from the pleadings and other papers filed in the cause: ... (9)
that several claims have been improperly united; .... .
9. Mo. REV. STAT. § 3376 (1939) provides: "When the husband, with-
out good cause, shall abandon his wife, and refuse or neglect to maintain
and provide for her, the circuit court, on her petition for that purpose,
shall order and adjudge such support and maintenance to be provided and
paid by the husband for the wife and her children, or any of them, by that
marriage, out of his property, and for such time as the nature of the case
and the circumstances of the parties shall require, and compel the husband
to give security for such maintenance, and from time to time make such
further orders touching the same as shall be just, and enforce such judg-
ment by execution, sequestration of property, or by such other lawful
means as are in accordance with the practice of the court; and as long as
said maintenance is continued, the husband shall not be charged with the
wife's debts, contracted after the judgment for such maintenance." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 3382 (1939) provides: "The petition of a married woman for
any of the purposes before mentioned may be filed and the case heard
and determined in the circuit court, and the like process and proceedings
shall be had as in other civil suits."
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which is to discourage separate litigations covering the same
subject matter, and to require their adjudication in the same
action .... 1o
At this point, consideration must be given to Section 74, which
is complementary to and a further clarification of Section 73.
Section 74 provides:
A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the
recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought
in the pleading of the opposing party.
Prior to the adoption of this section, it had been held that a
counterclaim that does not tend to defeat or diminish plaintiff's
right of recovery does not lie." Any existing doubt that Section
73 did not remove that requirement is eliminated by Section 74.
Thus in McCluskey et al. DeLong,12 the plaintiffs brought an
action to replevy an automobile truck and equipment. Defendant
filed both a general denial and a counterclaim, seeking in the lat-
ter to recover a sum of money for labor and material furnished in
repairing the truck. Plaintiffs contended that since the enforce-
ment of a repairman's lien was not sought in the counterclaim,
it did not tend to defeat or diminish plaintiff's right of recovery
of the possession of the property, and therefore the relief sought
should not be granted. The court denied that contention on
the basis of Section 74 and further held that the counterclaim
arose out of the transaction or occurrences that was the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim within the meaning of Section 73.
That Section 73 is a procedural statute has been emphasized
by the court in two cases, both of which held that that section
was not intended to change the substantive law as to what
constitutes a cause of action, or. when it accrues. Zickel v. Knell
et al." was an action for the dissolution of a partnership agree-
ment, an accounting to determine profits, and the plaintiff's
10. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland et al., 357 Mo. 634, 645, 210 S.W.2d 31,
36 (1948).
11. Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 350 Mo. 1208, 171 S.W.2d 641 (1943), where
it was held that a counterclaim that does not tend to defeat or diminish
plaintiff's right of recovery of possession of the property does not lie. And
see Bandy v. Westover, 200 Cal. 222, 252 Pac. 593 (1927), where a counter-
claim for money damages was held to be not proper in a suit to cancel a
deed on the same grounds, and Meyer v. Quiggle, 140 Cal. 495, 74 Pac.
40 (1903), where in an action to quiet title to certain land, the defendants
set up a claim for damages for breach of a contract not affecting the title
to the land in question.
12. 239 Mo. App. 1026, 198 S.W.2d 673 (1946).
13. 357 Mo. 678, 210 S.W.2d 59 (1948).
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share therein, and for the appointment of a receiver pendente
lite. Plaintiff alleged that more than $3,932.00 was due him.
Defendants denied the existence of a partnership, stated inter
alia a counterclaim for malicious prosecution for $50,000.00
actual and $25,000.00 punitive damages. The court below found
for the plaintiff and entered judgment in his favor. Defendants'
counterclaim for malicious prosecution was dismissed. It
appeared that defendants' malicious prosecution counterclaim
was based on the filing of this very action by plaintiff against
them. They claimed that this was a mandatory counterclaim
under Section 73 contending that it arose "out of the transaction
or occurrences that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim," and was a claim which they then had against plaintiff.
The Supreme Court rejected the contention of defendants as be-
ing incorrect because no action for malicious prosecution for the
filing of this action by plaintiff:
Then existed, or does now exist, or could ever accrue to de-
fendants until this suit terminated in their favor.... Sec-
tion 73 is only a procedural statute and it does not change
the substantive law as to what constitutes a cause of action
or when it accrues. Therefore, the court's action in dis-
missing this counterclaim was correct.14  -
In Niedringhaus v. Zucker,15 plaintiff filed a petition in eject-
ment against the defendant. The defendant filed an answer and
a counterclaim. The malicious prosecution alleged in the counter-
claim was based upon the petition in ejectment. Thereafter
plaintiff dismissed his petition and filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim, which the trial court sustained, and a judgment
of dismissal was entered. In affirming the judgment of the court
below, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that defendant's
counterclaim failed to state a cause of action.
It fails to allege the termination of the alleged malicious
action in favor of the appellant. Nor could the appellant
truthfully allege that the alleged malicious action terminated
in his favor because it is the respondent's petition in this
action that was pending at the time appellant's answer and
counterclaim were filed.
The termination of the alleged malicious action in favor of
the plaintiff who sues for damages must be alleged in order
to state a cause of action."
14. Id. at 681, 210 S.W.2d at 60.
15. 208 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1948).
16. Id. at 211.
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In other words at the time the counterclaim was filed no cause
of action had accrued for malicious prosecution. It could not
arise so long as plaintiff's petition was undisposed of and
still pending.
Whether the somewhat similar defense of recoupment is still
available in view of the broad provisions of Section 73 has
recently been determined in the St. Louis Court of Appeals."
A counterclaim differs from recoupment in that, under a
counterclaim, the defendant may have an affirmative judgment
where he establishes a demand in excess of the plaintiff's demand,
whereas in the case of recoupment, whatever the damages proved
by the defendant, they can only go to reduce, or extinguish the
claim against him. In Missouri, recoupment must arise out of the
transaction or occurrences upon which the plaintiff's claim is
founded, as must a counterclaim under Section 73. The only differ-
ence is the scope of recovery. If the defendant seeks merely to re-
duce or extinguish plaintiff's claim he may plead recoupment; if
he claims damages of his own, he pleads counterclaim. To illus-
lustrate: in Brush v. Miller,"8 plaintiff brought an action upon an
express contract for services rendered. The answer was a general
denial coupled with a special plea not pertinent to the matter
herein discussed. The controversial question in the case was
whether the defendant was entitled to make the defense, under a
mere generial denial, that the work was performed and the serv-
ices rendered in an unskillful and unworkmanlike manner, or,
should the defense of defective and unworkmanlike performance
be specially pleaded by the defendant in order to authorize the
introduction of evidence in support of such defense. In an
opinion by Bennick, C., which was adopted as the opinion of the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, the court said that had the action
been in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services,
the defendant could have shown, under general denial, any mat-
ter affecting the value of services, such as the fact that the work
was unskillfully performed. However, in view of the fact that
the action was on an express contract, evidence of defective
performance was improperly admitted as it authorized defend-
ant to prove new matter which constituted an affirmative defense
without pleading the same. The court then entered upon a
discussion of the defense of recoupment and said:
17. Brush v. Miller, 209 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App. 1948).
18. Ibid.
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The defense of which she was seeking to obtain the benefit
was actually one that the work, even though performed, was
so defective as to have been worthless, and thus have not
entitled plaintiff to recover the agreed price. Such a de-
fense involves a defendant's common-law right to recoup-
ment, and is very frequently asserted in actions of this
character. In its strict and literal sense it is a purely de-
fensive matter growing out of the transaction constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action, and applicable only to reduce
or satisfy the plaintiff's claim. In other words, it goes only
to mitigation or extinguishment of damages, and, differing
from a counterclaim, permits no affirmative judgment for
the defendant....
While the defense of recoupment has lost much of its identity
under the codes and is generally embraced in the subject
of counterclaim, it is none the less still available as a purely
defensive matter going only to the reduction or satisfaction
of the plaintiff's claim. In fact it would seem that in a case
such as this, the defendant, claiming defective perform-
ance, has his election whether to merely plead the defective
work in reduction of the plaintiff's damages, or whether to
plead his own damages as a counterclaim to be found af-
firmatively by the jury...
However the important thing, from the standpoint of our
present inquiry, is that recoupment is a defense based upon
new matter not included among the matters necessary to
make out the plaintiff's cause of action. By such a defense
the defendant does not deny the contract and the plaintiff's
performance under it, but by proof of defective performance
he seeks to avoid his liability to the plaintiff for payment of
the agreed price. In view of the nature of the defense as
one in confession and avoidance, the authorities consequently
hold that "in an action to recover the contract price agreed
to be paid for work and materials, defendant cannot show
that the work was done in an unworkmanlike manner, un-
less he has pleaded such defense."...11
All of which means that a counterclaim under Section 73 need
not be asserted if the defense of recoupment will serve the de-
fendant's purpose. But whether recoupment as a defensive mat-
ter can be shown under a general denial or must be specially
pleaded depends upon the character of the plaintiff's action.
We pass now to a consideration of Section 37 of the new code,
which provides:
The plaintiff in his petition or in a reply setting forth a
counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth
19. Id. at 820.
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a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alter-
nate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both
as he may have against an opposing party. There may be a
like joinder of claims where there are multiple parties if
the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 18 are satisfied.
There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or third-party
claims if the requirements of Section 77 and Section 20,
respectively, are satisfied.20
It is apparent that the legislature, in adopting the above sec-
tion, intended to give the parties the opportunity to set up cross-
demands going beyond the set-off as it existed long prior to the
adoption of the Code. Set-off had its origin in courts of equity.
It consisted of a pleading filed by the defendant in which he
confessed his indebtedness to the plaintiff, but alleged that, be-
cause of an existing indebtedness which the plaintiff owed him,
20. Civil Code of Missouri, Section 37: Section 15.-(a) Subject to the
provisions of Section 19 of this code, persons having a joint interest shall
be parties and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
When a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his con-
sent cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant. (b) When a com-
plete determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence
of other parties, the court may order them to be brought in by an amend-
ment of the petition, or by a supplemental petition and a new summons.(Section 19 relates to the subject of class actions.) Section 16-(a) All
persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them jointly severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defendiing against all the relief de-
manded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs accord-
ing to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants
according to their respective liabilities. (b) The court may make such
orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to
expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and
who asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make
other orders to prevent delay or prejudice. Section 18. Persons having
claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to
interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be ex-
posed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to thejoinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not 
identical but are
adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that
he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A de-
fendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way
of cross-claims or counter-claim. The provisions of this section supple-
ment and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Sec-
tion 16 of this code. Sections 20 and 77 relate to the subject of counter-
claims by third party plaintiffs or defendants and cross-claims.
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the plaintiff ought not to recover more than the difference be-
tween the two claims. At common law, however, if the claim
arose out of a transaction other than the one sued upon and was
not connected with the subject of the action, it could not be used
as a cross-demand. Not until 1705 was set-off of mutual debts
allowed by statute in actions at law brought by insolvents21 and
by a later statute in 1729, mutual debts generally were allowed
to be set off in actions at law. 2  But the word "debt" had a
technical meaning and restricted the application of the statute to
claims arising from contract, express or implied, where the
amount was liquidated and certain. The Missouri statutes now
repealed by the new Code, treated mutual debts 3 separately
from actions arising on contracts.24 It is to be noted that Sec-
tion 37 imposes no limitations of that kind, but rather encour-
ages the liberal use of cross-demands. In view of the fact, how-
ever, that Section 37 contemplates setting forth independent or
alternative counterclaims, that is counterclaims which do not
grow out of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's
claim is based, the use thereof is permissive only, so that de-
fendant may, if he chooses, maintain an independent action
against the plaintiff, and failure on his part to assert his claim
in plaintiff's action will not constitute a waiver.
It is to be noted parenthetically that Section 37 permits either
party in his pleading to join claims either legal or equitable or
both as he may have against an opposing party. Thus the plain-
tiff in an action at law for negligence and trespass on his lands
in discharging surface water thereon from the defendant's higher
land may join an equitable action to enjoin the defendant from
permitting flow of surface water onto plaintiff's lands. Prior
to the adoption of the new Code, and Section 37 in particular,
the subject of joinder of causes of action presented one of the
most perplexing problems to the courts. Joinder of causes was
restricted according to a fixed classification set out in the Code.
These classes included actions arising out of the same transaction
or transactions connected with the same subject of action; con-
21. STAT., 4 ANNE, c. 17, § 11 (1705).
22. STAT., 2 GEo. II, c. 22, § 13 (1729), and the amendment thereto
STAT., 8 GEo. H, c. 24 (1735).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 989 (1939).
24. Mo. REy. STAT. § 929 (1939).
25. Casanover et al. v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App.
1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tracts, express or implied; injuries to person; injuries to the
character; injuries to property, actions to recover real prop-
erty with or without damages; actions to recover personal prop-
erty with or without damages. 6 The causes so united had to
belong to one of these classes and were required to be separately
stated. Whether the basis of the classification was convenient
is doubtful and that it produced results not foreseen by the
framers of the code seems quite apparent from an examination
of the cases. For example, under a similar provision of the
New York Code, in De Wolfe v. Abraham,27 the plaintiff sued
the defendants for slander, alleging that, at their place of busi-
ness and in the presence and hearing of a large number of peo-
ple, the defendants, through their agents, charged plaintiff with
theft, in that she had stolen from them a certain ring. The
question whether the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend
her petition for slander by adding thereto the statement of a
cause of action for false imprisonment was answered in the
negative by the New York Court of Appeals. The court said
that false imprisonment was an injury to the person and was
embraced in a subdivision different from slander. The court
also said that the causes did not arise out of the same trans-
action though they originated at the same time. Small wonder
that in time such restrictions were removed and that eventually
freedom was allowed in the joinder of causes of action without
any restrictions based on their character or subject matter under
more modern codes.
No doubt, both because of the clear idea content of Section
37 of the Code and because of its rather recent adoption, few
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 917 (1939) provided: "The plaintiff may unite in
the same petition several causes of action, whether they be such as have
been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they all
arise out of: First, the same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action; or, second, contract, express or implied; or, third,
injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either; or,
fourth, injuries to character; or, fifth, claims to recover real property, with
or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits
of the same; or, sixth, claims to recover personal property, with or with-
out damages, for the withholding thereof; or, seventh, claims by or against
a party in some representative or fiduciary capacity, by virtue of a con-
tract, or by operation of law. But the causes of action so united must all
belong to one of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action,
and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated,
with the relief sought for each cause of action, in such manner that they
may be intelligibly distinguished."
27. 151 N.Y. 186, 45 N.E. 455 (1896).
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cases are to be found in Missouri: Casanover v. Viflanova
Realty, involved joinder of causes of action by the plaintiff.
In Rose et al. v. Houser et. al., " the plaintiffs joined a cause of
action in equity with one at law in their petition, as did the
defendants in their cross petition. The court found such joinder
by defendants proper under Section 37. In Turner v. Alton
Baaking & Trust Co.,"0 the court allowed a counterclaim under
Section 37 to be asserted against a foreign executor as an in-
dividual. The Fawkes case,3' supra, has already been discussed
in connection with mandatory counterclaims. No other cases
have been found.
Reference must be made at this stage to Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 3.16 which places some restrictions on the use of
permissive counterclaims. The rule provides:
A pleading may state as a counterclaim any matured claim
against an adverse party, not arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the adverse
party's claim, which the party had at the time of filing
his first required pleading. (Supplemental to Sees. 37, 73,
75 and 77, 1943 Act.)
It is difficult to see why this rule should be supplemental
to Section 73, since by the very words of the rule the counter-
claim contemplated cannot arise out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the opponent's claim. Very
likely it was not intended that the rule should cover Section 73
and it is suggested here that by its wording it can have refer-
ence to Sections 37 and 75 only.
An excellent illustration of the principle, though the case had
been decided long before the adoption of the new code, is to be
found in a decision by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Jansen v.
Dolan,"2 a suit on an account. By way of answer thereto, de-
fendant interposed her counterclaim which alleged that plaintiff
deprived her of the use of a one-horse stake wagon and one
set of harness, owned by the defendant, between September 4,
1908 and January 26, 1909, excepting Sundays and holidays,
the reasonable value of which was alleged to be $1 per day, by
reason whereof defendant asked a recovery against plaintiff in
28. 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App. 1948).
29. 206 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. App. 1947).
30. 166 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1948).
31. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland et al., 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 31
(1948).
32. 157 Mo. App. 32, 137 S.W. 27 (1911).
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the total sum of $113 for the time he retained the stake wagon
and set of harness without her consent. The counterclaim
showed on its face that the cause of action declared upon therein
arose from the tort of plaintiff in withholding possession of de-
fendant's stake wagon and harness against her will. The coun-
terclaim also showed that defendant waived the tort of conver-
sion and elected to sue as in assumpsit for the reasonable value
and use at $1 per day. Said the court:
There can be no doubt that in many instances it is competent
for a party to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for the
reasonable value of the article or thing or the use thereof
of which defendant by his wrongful act has deprived him
and appropriated its benefits to himself. That it was com-
petent for defendant to waive the tort and her right to sue
therefor in conversion in the present instance, and instead
claim the reasonable value of the use of the wagon and har-
ness during the time defendant retained it, is not to be
questioned. Where such right of election obtains and the
suit is in contract, the law is well-nigh universal to the effect
that one may, under the second subdivision of the statuteR3
set forth a counterclaim as also arising on contract, though
it originated in the tortious act of plaintiff, if the tort is
waived and an implied contract declared upon provided a
right of recovery therefor existed at the commencement of
the action. 3'
Defendant might have sued in conversion for the value of both
wagon and harness, but instead elected to proceed in assumpsit
on the implied undertaking to make compensation for the rea-
sonable value for the use. The jury awarded defendant a re-
covery on the counterclaim for the full amount of $113.
A considerable portion of this is unauthorized under the
statute on counterclaims, for by its express provision no
recovery can be had except on a demand existing at the com-
mencement of the action .... The present action was insti-
tuted by plaintiff November 17, 1908, and the first item of
the counterclaim is of date September 4, 1908. So much
of the counterclaim as accrued between September 4, 1908
and November 17, 1908, the time the suit was filed, is avail-
able to defendant. But that portion of it consisting of
33. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1807 (1909), in force at the time, provided that
in an action arising in contract, any other cause of action arising also in
contract and existing at the commencement of the action could be pleaded
and considered as a counterclaim.
34. Jansen v. Dolan, 157 Mo. App. 32, 35, 137 S.W. 27, 28 (1911).
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items from November 17, 1908 to January 26, 1909, inclu-
sive, may not be allowed, and the court erred in submitting
it to the jury under instructions given. 5
It should be noted that with the permission of the court, a
party may under Section 7536 file a counterclaim by way of sup-
plemental pleading if his claim either matured or was acquired
after he filed his required pleading. However, to come within
the scope of this section a counterclaim must have "matured."
If the counterclaim has not matured it states no cause of ac-
tion. Thus in the two cases discussed in connection with man-
datory counterclaims, 37 the proposed counterclaims had not ma-
tured because the relief sought was dependent upon plaintiffs'
failure to prevail in their action. Pleading a claim for damages
arising from the wrongful bringing of an action before the final
determination thereof is premature and unauthorized by Sec-
tion 75.
Should the pleader fail to set up a counterclaim through over-
sight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment, by authority of Section 76.1 There are no cases
to be found on this subject. It is submitted, however, that the
pleader in making the application will be required to show that
'he is not guilty of laches or apparent lack of good faith.
II. CROSS-CLAIMS
Section 77 of the new Code provides:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may
include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted
is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of
a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 9
35. Id. at 36, 137 S.W. at 28.
36. Civil Code of Missouri, Section 75, provides: "A claim which either
matured or was acquired by the pleader after the serving of his pleading
may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by
supplemental pleading."
37. Zickel v. Knell et al.. 357 Mo. 678, 210 S.W.2d 59 (1948); Nied-
ringhaus v. Zucker, 208 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1948).
38. Civil Code of Missouri, Section 76, provides: "When a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neg-
lect, or when justice requires he may by leave of court set up the counter-
claim."
39. Civil Code of Missouri, Section 77. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
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This section looks to a speedy adjudication of all controversies
between co-parties in a single action and without multiplicity
of suits. To be a valid cross-claim it must be one that is asserted
against a co-party" concerning matters in question either in
the original petition or in a counterclaim. One case in which
Section 77 could have been invoked is Camden v. St. Louis Pub-
lic Service Co.41 That suit was brought by plaintiff against
the St. Louis Public Service Company and certain truck own-
ers for personal injuries sustained in a collision between a truck
in which plaintiff was riding and a street car. Plaintiff recov-
ered a judgment in the sum of $2,500 against all defendants.
The truck owners thereupon filed a motion for a new trial which
was sustained. The Service Company did not file any motion
for a new trial. Plaintiff then filed a motion dismissing as to
the truck owners and praying for final judgment against the
Service Company. The company then filed a motion praying that
the court enter its order holding in abeyance the verdict and
judgment against the company until a retrial of the cause de-
termined the liability of the truck owners, or, in the alternative,
if the court sustained said motion of plaintiff, then to allow the
Service Company a reasonable time in which to file a third-party
petition against the truck owners. The court sustained plain-
tiff's motion and dismissed as to the truck owners and also
ordered a final judgment against the company. At the same
time, the court overruled the alternative motion of the Service
Company. The company appealed from the court's order. The
St. Louis Court of Appeals found no error in the procedure fol-
lowed by the trial court and affirmed its orders. It served this
admonition:
There was another remedy open to defendant Service Com-
pany of which it did not avail itself. It had a right to file
a crossclaim under Section 77 of the new Civil Code....
Section 77, supra, is exactly the same as Rule 13 (g) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
An example of the construction and application of the
above mentioned rule will be found in Bohn v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 228, which was a case that
arose under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that
case Henry Bohn, the plaintiff, brought his action for per-
40. A claim by a defendant against the plaintiff is a counterclaim; a
claim against a co-party is a cross-claim.
41. 239 Mo. App. 1199, 206 S.W.2d 699 (1947).
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sonal injuries against American Export Lines and the Wyle
Lighterage Corporation. In his petition plaintiff alleged
that while he was engaged in the performance of his duties
as an employee of American Export Lines he was struck
by bags of coal which were being hoisted by the Wyle Light-
erage Corporation. American Export Lines filed a cross-
claim against the Wyle Lighterage Corporation in which it
alleged that the Wyle Lighterage Corporation was primarily
liable for the injuries sustained, setting forth allegations of
facts as grounds for such contention. The Wyle Lighterage
Corporation filed a motion to have the cross-claim stricken.
This motion was denied by the Court. In reaching its con-
clusion, the Court said: "Although at common law,... the
liability sued upon had first to become fixed by a judgment,
I think under Rule 13 (g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
... that element is no longer requisite, for it is plain that a
cross-claim permitted thereunder may 'include a claim that
the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant.'" . . . The above Federal case dem-
onstrates that the defendant Service Company in the case at
bar had a remedy against the Beckers [truck owners], but
decided for reasons of its own not to pursue such remedy. "
III. THIRD-PARTY PETITIONS
Section 20 of the new Code provides:
(a) Before filing his answer, a defendant may move ex
parte or, after the filing of his answer, on notice to the
plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to file a petition
and serve a summons upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is
granted and the petition is filed and summons served, the
person so served, hereinafter called the third-party defen-
dant, shall make his defenses, counterclaims and cross-claims
against the plaintiff, or any other party as provided in this
code. The third-party defendant may assert any defenses
which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication of
the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as well
as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff.
The plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against the
third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might
have asserted against the third-party had he been joined
originally as a defendant. A third-party defendant may
proceed under this section against any person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable to him or to the third-
42. Id. at 1208, 206 S.W.2d at 704.
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party plaintiff for all or part of the claim made in the action
against the third-party defendant. (b) When a counter.
claim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third-
party to be brought in under circumstances which under this
section would entitle a defendant to do so. 3
The section just quoted furnishes procedure for the bringing
in of new parties to an action on the application of a defendant.
The third-party defendant may be brought in on a showing that
he is or may be liable either to the defendant or to the plaintiff
for the claim which plaintiff is asserting against the defendant.
From the foregoing it would follow that the original defendant
may not implead as a third-party defendant a party who is not
liable to either the plaintiff or the defendant, but to whom the
defendant is or may be liable. It is also clear that this section
precludes a defendant's right of election in the original plaintiff
except that a plaintiff may bring in a third party when a counter-
claim is asserted against him. This does not mean that the
plaintiff may not amend his petition so as to state a claim against
the third-party defendant after the latter has been brought in
by the original defendant. In fact Section 20 specifically provides
that "the plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against the
third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have
asserted against the third-party defendant had he been joined
originally as a defendant." That a third-party claim must arise
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences as the original claim presented against the de-
fendent is settled in Missouri by Camden v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., supra, already adverted to in the section on cross-
claims.
Whether leave to implead a third-party defendant should be
granted appears to be within the discretion of the court. It is
possible to envisage three situations which might determine the
court's action. For example, under Section 20 the defendant
might bring in (1) a person who is claimed to be liable over
to defendant; (2) a person who is claimed to be liable solely
to the plaintiff for the claim asserted against the defendant;
or (3) a person who is claimed to be liable jointly to the plaintiff
for the claim asserted against the defendant.
43. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (a) and (b).
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The Supreme Court recently had occasion to consider a case
falling within the first situation, State ex rel. Algiere v. RussellU.
The question to be decided was whether a claim of indemnity,
by a principal against an agent, was proper subject matter for
a third party proceeding in a case in which the complaining party
asserted a claim for damages against the principal based on the
agent's negligence. The court held that the agent was properly
brought into the case as a third-party defendant on the theory
that the agent who subjects his principal to liability because of a
negligent or other wrongful act is himself subject to liability
to the principal for the loss which results therefrom. There
is actually no reason for denying a motion to implead in a case
of this kind, since little prejudice to plaintiff will result. At
the same time the defendant should not be put to the delay
and expense of a second action.
A case in point under the second situation is Browne v. Creek
et al.,4" decided by the Supreme Court. In that case plaintiff
brought an action against the defendants for her injuries. De-
fendants moved for leave to file a third-party petition bringing
in the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding,
claiming that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the collision and the injuries complained of. The plaintiff
declined to amend her petition so as to include him as a party
defendant. The trial court thereupon denied the defendants'
application for leave to include him as a party defendant. The
Supreme Court in sustaining the position of the trial court
stated:
While there has been some diversity of opinion as to the
right of a defendant to tender an additional third party
defendant alleged to be solely liable for the injuries com-
plained of and who is not liable to the defendant, it has
become the better accepted and the better reasoned view, in
the circumstances of this record, that there is no abuse of
discretion when the trial court refuses the application .... 16
The court relies heavily on precedents under Federal Rule
14(a), the latter having brought into the civil procedure the
practice of admiralty courts, the English courts and certain state
44. 223 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1949).
45. 357 Mo. 576, 209 S.W.2d 900 (1948).
46. Id. at 580, 209 S.W.2d at 903. See also Dennis v. Creek et al., 211
S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1948).
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courts (New ,York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). Whether
the language of the statute that "a defendant may move... for
leave as a third party plaintiff to fie a petition and serve a sum-
mons upon a person not a party to the action . . ." is intended
to make the impleading of third parties discretionary with the
trial court depends upon whether the words "for leave" are
susceptible of that construction. The same is true of the
language that follows the above quoted abstract "If the motion
is granted . . ." Against the contention that the right is in the
defendant and not in the court is apparently all the case law
to be found in the admiralty, English, New York, Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin reports. 47 With this background of decisions there
can be no doubt that it was intended to make the impleading
of third parties discretionary with the trial courts. And the
Missouri courts are now committed to this proposition. So,
under the Browne case, supra, if the third-party is not liable
over to the original defendant but is only directly liable to the
original plaintiff, it would become necessary for the original
plaintiff to amend his petition; however, the original defendant
cannot compel the plaintiff also to sue a third party whom he does
not wish to sue, by tendering in a third-party petition the third
party as an additional defendant directly liable to plaintiff. In
other words the tender becomes effective only if the original
plaintiff amends his petition to state a cause of action against the
new defendant, and if the plaintiff declines to assert any claim
against the third party it is no abuse of discretion to deny
impleader.
The third situation, where liability to plaintiff and to defendant
is asserted, is like the second. The case in point is State ex rel.
McClure v. Dinwiddie 8  It settles the question of impleading
joint tort-feasors; the defendant can not compel the plaintiff
to accept a third party defendant. This result can be justified
on the ground that the old common-law rule of no contribution is
to some extent still in effect in Missouri,49 contribution being
47. See 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 741 (1938).
48. 213 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1948).
49. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 3658 (1939) provides: "Contribution.-Defendants
in a judgment founded on an action for the redress of a private wrong
shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such judg-
ment in the same manner and to the same extent as defendants in a judg-
ment in an action founded on contract. It shall be lawful for all persons
having a claim or cause of action against two or more joint tort-feasors
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permitted only after a joint judgment against the tort-feasors.
Since under the statute the defendant has no right to contri-
bution unless a joint judgment is rendered against both tort-
feasors, it follows that unless the plaintiff sues the third party
or amends his petition to include the third party, the court
will have discretion to grant or refuse leave to file the third-
party petition.
or wrongdoers to compound, settle with, and discharge any and every one
or more of said joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers for such sum as such
person or persons may see fit, and to release him or them from all further
liability to such person or persons for such tort or wrong, without impair-
ing the right of such person or persons to demand and collect the balance
of said claim or cause of action from the other joint tort-feasors or wrong-
doers against whom such person or persons has such claim or cause of
action, and not so released."
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